Abstract-By using existing mechanisms, especially for S-BGP, IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH tampering can be prevented despite some unsatisfied inherent factors. However, except IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH tampering, there are some other traffic attraction attacks, which are currently not considered and prevented in existing mechanisms. Attracting more by announcing long paths, which is typical one of these traffic attraction attacks, can be prevented by the presented method. The presented method, which consists of two algorithms, adds the sequence of relationship marks in update messages and verifies them. Moreover, the presented method combines the mechanisms of authenticating origin AS and AS-PATH. Two algorithms, one of which is executed on senders and the other is executed on receivers, are given. The presented method can defend against the attack that is attracting more by announcing long paths, besides IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH tampering. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work for defending against the attack that is attracting more by announcing long paths.
I. INTRODUCTION
The BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) is a sole operating protocol for exchanging routing information among Autonomous Systems (ASs) in today's Internet. Routes, through which the traffic is transported among ASs, are controlled mainly by BGP [1] [2] [3] .
BGP was designed under the assumption that all nodes in the network can trust each other. As such, BGP does not have any mechanisms to validate that a path announced by an AS in BGP is actually used for forwarding traffic, or even exists in the Internet topology [1] .
So, In BGP, update messages are hardly authenticated when broadcasting among ASs, which leaves an opportunity for malicious attackers to fabricate false update messages. There are many vulnerabilities in BGP, which bring about various attacks mistaking interdomain routes [4] [5] . These attacks include IP prefix hijacking [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] , AS-PATH tampering [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , and other traffic attraction attacks [16] .
The networking research community has put together a number of research proposals to remedy this [1] [5] . There are many cryptography-based mechanisms which propose various extensions to BGP [17] [18] [19] . By using these existing mechanisms, especially for S-BGP, IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH tampering can be prevented despite some unsatisfied inherent factors [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Some typical existing related mechanisms are explained as follows.
S-BGP [6] , RPKI [7] , and BGPSEC [8] implement security by validating path attributes in update messages passed between ASes through the use of digital signatures and associated public key certificates. All information exchanged in these mechanisms is validated using the certificates. Address ownership, peer AS identity, path vectors, policy attributes, and control messages are all signed by the organizations or devices that create them. Because this allows receivers of the data to unambiguously authenticate the routing information, they can detect and remove forged data.
A refinement of S-BGP, soBGP [18] , is an attempt to strike a pragmatic balance between the security processing overhead and the capabilities of deployed routing systems and security infrastructure, where the requirements for AS Path verification are relaxed and the nature of the related Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is altered to remove the requirement for a strict hierarchical address PKI that precisely mirrors the address distribution framework.
Another refinement of S-BGP, psBGP [19] , represents a similar effort at crafting a compromise between security and deployed capability through the crafting of a trust rating for assertions based on assessment of confidence in corroborating material.
The Interdomain Route Validation (IRV) service is a receiver-driven protocol and associated architecture [1] , and is the least centralized of the comprehensive solutions for securing BGP. Unlike S-BGP, IRV's operation is independent of the routing protocol. Every AS in IRV contains an IRV server. The central limitation of IRV is that it needs a functioning network to be useful: a client indirectly uses the network to communicate with the foreign AS to query the appropriate AS IRV server.
However, except IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH, there are some other traffic attraction attacks. Most of these attacks are listed in the document [16] , For example, attracting more by announcing long paths, attracting more by exporting less, and attracting more by gaming loop detection and so on. Hardly any of them is considered and prevented in existing mechanisms because these existing mechanisms focus on defending against IP prefix Figure 1 . An example of attack that is attracting more by announcing long paths [16] hijacking and AS-PATH tampering [16] . Yet, Sometimes, harm arised in these attack strategies is more significant than that arised in aggressive prefix hijacking or AS-PATH tampering [16] . Obviously, it is a very complex, long-term, arduous task to defend against these attacks.
In this paper, we propose an extension to defend against one of these traffic attraction attacks. The traffic attraction attack considered in this paper is called attracting more by announcing long paths [16] . At the same time, AS-PATH tampering and IP prefix hijacking can also be prevented in the presented method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related attacks are simply introduced in Section II, which include IP prefix hijacking, AS-PATH tampering, and attracting more by announcing long paths. The presented method, whose main aim is to defend against attracting more by announcing long paths, is detailedly decribed in Section III. Moreover, the presented method can defend against IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH tampering. In Section IV, we evaluate the security and performance of presented method. Finally, we present the conclusions and future work in Section V.
II. THE CONSIDERED ATTACKS
The considered attacks in this paper are IP prefix hijacking, AS-PATH tampering, and attracting more by announcing long paths. We lay stress on the attracting more by announcing long paths, because it can not be prevented by existing mechanisms. These considered attacks are simply introduced in this subsection, before which we should know main rules an AS uses to select routes. The main rules used to select routes are as follows.
(1) Firstly, Local preferences are applied. There are two public rules about the local preferences, which are called "R1" and "R2". These two rules are explained as following [5] . R1: The model of export policies, which can be regarded as a public one of local preferences, is based on the Gao-Rexford policy: AS "b" can announce a path via AS "c" to AS "a" only if at least one of "a" and "c" is customers of "b". In other words, a "peer-to-peer" route or "customer-to-provider" route has to be followed hard after by no route or a "provider-to-customer" route.
R2:
We term a route to be a "customer-route" or a "peer-route" or a "provider-route" depending on whether the last-hop AS in the AS-PATH is a customer, a peer or a provider respectively. Measurement studies in the past have shown that a large majority of ASs on the Internet tend to assign higher local preference values to customerroutes than to peer-routes than to provider routes.
(2) The shortest AS path is chosen. Update message receivers will prefer the shortest internal path within the autonomous system to reach the destination (the shortest path to the BGP next-hop). Obviously, the length of real internal path is equal to the length of AS-PATH attribute value of received update messages. Thus, if there are more than one update messages including same destination prefix and values of local preferences of these update messages are same, the one including shortest AS-PATH attribute value will be chosen.
A. IP prefix Hijacking and AS-PATH Tampering
IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH tampering can not succeed against typical existing secure routing protocol such as S-BGP [6] and soBGP [18] .
(1) IP prefix hijacking [5] : An AS advertises a prefix from address space unassigned by or belonging to another AS. Neighboring ASs receiving this announcement may select this route and direct traffic toward the wrong AS; these ASs may, in turn, advertise the BGP route to their own neighbors.
(2) AS-PATH tampering [5] : An AS forges the ASpath attribute to pollute the advertised route. For example, by truncating the AS-PATH, an AS can make a route look shorter, and hence more attractive. [16] This attack is one of three surprising counterexamples of traffic attraction attacks. It can succeed against existing secure routing protocol including S-BGP and soBGP [16] .
B. Attracting more by Announcing Long Paths
Shown as Figure 1 , there are two kinds of edges: customer-to-provider (where the customer pays the provider for connectivity, represented with an arrow from customer to provider), and peerto-peer (where two ASs owned by different organizations agree to transit each other's traffic at no cost, represented with an undirected edge). a character used to connect two separated strings The inverse operator of "||". It is a character used to remove substring from origin string, for example,
The predicate NOT. In other words,  true = false,  false = true prefixi the advertised prefix, which is a sample prefix advertised by update message S(x) [y] the signature signed by the y, where the signed message is x AA address attestation RAn route attestation created by ASn SMGn
The signed message, which will be signed by ASn R(i)
The relationship between ASi and ASi+1, where R(i) = 1 denotes ASi is customer of ASi+1, R(i) = 2 denotes ASi is peer of ASi+1, and R(i) = 3 denotes ASi is provider of ASi+1. pk-1
The public key of owner of prefixi, which is known by all of ASs. <pk0, pk1, …, pkn> Public keys respectively corresponding to <AS0, AS1, AS2, …, ASn>, which are known by all of ASs.
V(S, M)pk
The result of verification of digital signature, where S denotes the digital signature, M denotes the signed message, the pk denotes the public key used to verify the S. V(S, M)pk = TRUE is satisfied if the verification succeeds; otherwise, V(S, M)pk = FALSE is satisfied. Figure 1 : The malicious AS "m" is a small stub AS in Basel, Switzerland, that has one large provider "a1" that has almost 500 customers and 50 peers, and one small provider AS "a2" in Basel that has degree only four. The victim is European broadband provider "v" with over 100 customers and 26 peers.
Naive strategy: The figure 1(a) shows the "ShortestPath Export-All" attack strategy, where the malicious AS naively announces a three-hop available path, (m, a1, v, Prefix) to his provider "a2". Since ASs "a2" and "a3" prefer the customer path that leads to the malicious AS "m", over their existing peer paths, both will forward traffic to "m". He intercepts traffic from 16% of the ASs in the internetwork (5569 ASs), including 25% of ASs with at least 25 customers, and 41% of ASs with at least 250 customers.
Clever strategy: The figure 1(b) shows the adversary cleverly announcing a four-hop available path (m, a2, a3, v, Prefix) to his provider "a1". The large ISP "a1" will prefer the longer customer path through the adversary over his shorter peer connection to victim "v", but this time, the adversary triples the amount of traffic he attracts, intercepting traffic from a total of 56% of the ASs in the internetwork (18664 ASs), including 69% of ASs with at least 25 customers, and 85% of ASs with at least 250 customers. In fact, by announcing a longer path, the malicious "m" earns almost as much traffic as the aggressive prefix hijack.
Why it works:
Notice that the adversary's large provider "a1" has hundreds more neighbors then his small provider, "a2", and that the clever strategy attracts large ISP a1's traffic while the naive strategy attracts small AS "a2". Attracting traffic from the larger AS is crucial to the adversary's success; in fact, it is more important than announcing short paths.
III. THE PRESENTED METHOD
In this section, we present our method, whose main aim is to defend against the attack shown as Figure 1 . Moveover, the presented method can prevent IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH tampering.
For defending against attracting more by announcing long paths, we need to carefully analyse this kind of attack. Shown as Fig. 1(a) , the rule R2 is used by "a2" (where "a2" is polluted) and thus the false route is chosen. The rule R1 is not obeyed by "a2" because the "a2" can not know whether "a1" is the custom of "m" or not (the rule R1 and R2 can be seen in Section 2).
In existing mechanisms proposed to secure BGP including S-BGP, RPKI&BGPSEC [7] [8], or soBGP, there is no mechanism for protecting the rule R1. Therefore, this kind of attack can not be defended against in these mechanisms.
Obviously, if only a mechanism is added to protect the public rule R1, the attack shown as Fig. 1 can be defended against. In our method, the mechanism for protecting rule R1 can be simply described as following. When an AS announces a path to next-hop AS, it should add a relationship mark and sign this mark using itself private key. According to these relationship marks, verifiers can judge whether the rule R1 is obeyed or not. A relationship mark is used to denote the relationship between current AS and next-hop AS. We use "1" to denote that next-hop AS is the custom of current AS, "2" to denote that next-hop AS is the peer of current AS, and "3" to denote that next-hop AS is the provider of current AS. The symbol "||" is used to join two relationships.
When an AS receives a path announcement from lasthop AS, it should verify the sequence of relationship marks besides origin AS and AS-PATH by using related public keys. The presented method includes two algorithms. The first algorithm is executed on senders, the second one is executed on receivers. These two algorithms are as Algorithm1 and Algorithm2.
A. The algorithm executed on senders
Shown as Fig. 2 , senders in this section include the owner of advertised prefix, and all of ASs in the AS-PATH including AS 0 , AS 1 , AS 2 ,… , AS n-1 , AS n . Assume current AS is AS n , which is a sample sender. The algorithm executed on senders can be illustrated as Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, the step 1 is executed only by the owner of advertised prefix, other steps are executed by AS n .
Algorithm 1: The algorithm executed on senders 1. The owner of prefixi creates an address attestation:
The owner of prefixi creates a digital signature by signing the AS0#. This digital signature is address attestation. In formula (1), AA denotes address attestation, S( )[O] denotes the signature signed by the owner of prefixi, "[o]" denotes owner of prefixi.
2. ASn receives the update message from ASn-1. From the update message, ASn draws AA, prefixi, AS-PATHn, and RA0, RA1, RA2, …, RAn-1.
3. ASn constructs the AS-PATHn: The initial AS-PATH0 is "AS0#". The recusion formula of AS-PATHn is that
Thus, we can see that AS-PATHn = "AS0||AS1 || AS2||...||ASn"
4. ASn constructs signed message about AS-PATHn: The signed message, which is used by ASn and denoted by SMGn, is not same as AS-PATHn whereas there is close relationship between it and ASPATHn. We can regard this kind of signed message as something combining AS-PATHn and relationships between neighbors ASs. Assume SMG-1= Null. The recusion formula of SMGn is that
Thus, we can see that
5. ASn signs the message SMGn by using itself private key. This digital signature is route attestation.
6. ASn sends related information to ASn+1. These related information mainly includes prefixi#, SMGn, AA, and all of route attestations. Note that there are several route attestations because all of ASs in AS-PATH including AS0, AS1, AS2,…, ASn-1, ASn, will create route attestation respectively. These route attestations include RA1, RA2, …, RAn.
Next, by referring Fig. 3 and respective describing actions of various ASs in AS-PATH, we illustrate how to execute the Algorithm 1.
(1) The action of owner of prefix i : Assume current prefix i is 23.67.34.0/24, the owner of this prefix i is ASN-TELSTRA, AS 0 is AS1211. According to step 1, ASN-TELSTRA creates the AA which is signature S("AS1211") [ AS1211 creates AS-PATH 0 which is "AS1211" according to formula (2) and formula (3) . A signed message is created according to step 4. Assume that the AS 1 is the peer of AS 0 , and thus R(0)=2 (see the table 1) . Obviously, according to formula (4) and formula (5), the signed message SMG 0 should be "AS1211||2".
AS1211 creates RA 0 according to formula (6) (3) The action of AS 1 : Assume the AS 1 is AS1222. Shown as Fig. 3 , AS 1 can draw AA, prefix i , AS-PATH 0 , and RA 0 in the update message sent from AS 0 according to the step 2. In other words, AS1222 can draw S("AS1211") [ASN-TELSTRA] , "23.67.34.0/24", "AS1211||2", and S("AS1211||2") [AS1211] in the received update message. AS1222 creates AS-PATH 1 which is "AS1211||AS1222" according to formula (2) and formula (3) . The signed message is created according to step 4. Assume that the AS 2 is the customer of AS 1 , and thus R(1)=1. Obviously, according to formula (4) and formula (5), the signed message SMG 1 should be "AS1211||2||AS1222||1".
AS1222 creates RA 1 according to formula (6) AS1359 creates AS-PATH n which is "AS1211||AS1222||……||AS1359" according to formula (2) and formula (3) . The signed message is created according to step 4. Assume that the AS n+1 is the customer of AS n , and thus R(n)=1.
Obviously, according to formula (4) and formula (5), the signed message SMG n should be "AS1211||2||AS1222||1||…||AS1359||1".
AS1359 creates RA n according to formula (6) of step 5. The RA n should be
, "AS1211||2||AS1222||1||…||AS1359||1", and "23.67.34.0/24" to AS1465.
B. The Algorithm Executed on Receivers
Shown as Fig. 2 , receivers in this section include all of ASs in the AS-PATH. These ASs are that AS 0 , AS 1 , AS 2 ,… , AS n , AS n+1 . We regard AS n+1 as the sample receiver. When AS n+1 receives an update message including address attestation and route attestations from AS n , this sample receiver will draw and verify the address attestation and route attestations using related public keys. These related public keys are assumed to be known by AS n+1 , which are pk -1 , pk 0 , pk 1 , …, pk n . The AS 0 is authenticated after address attestation is verified. The AS-PATH and sequence of relationship marks are authenticated after route attestations are verified. The algorithm executed on ASn+1 can be illustrated as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: The Algorithm Executed on Receivers 1. ASn+1 draws related information in update message sent from ASn. These related information mainly includes prefixi#, SMGn, AA, and all of route attestations. These route attestations contain RA1, RA2, …, RAn.
2. Check whether the rule R1 is obeyed or not: For this checking, the relationship mark sub-sequence contained by SMGn should be inspected according to the rule R1. If the rule R1 is not obeyed, the update message should be rejected.
For example, if the SMGn is "AS0#||2||AS1#|1||AS2#|2", the relationship mark sub-sequence is <2, 1, 2>, which represents the relationship shown as Fig. 4 . This relationship violates the Rule R1 because in this path, neither AS0 nor AS2 is the customer of AS1.
3. Verify address attestation: Draw the AS0# from SMGn. Using the public key pk-1 and the signed message "AS0#", the address attestation can be verified. The formula about the verification is as follow. that is FALSE V(AA, AS #) ＝ ), this update message will be rejected.
Verify route attestations:
In order to verify route attestations, the related public keys should be used. These route attestations are the signature of the SMG0, SMG1, ……, SMGn. These related public keys are pk0, pk1, …, pkn. Note that the process of verifying is iterative because there are several route attestations. For example, the current constructed message is "AS0||2||AS1||3||AS2||2", the related public keys are pk0, pk1, and pk2. The example process of verifying is as follows. 
IV. EVALUATE

A. Security
In this subsection, we evaluate the security of presented method. By executing Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, the sample receiver AS n+1 can authenticate origin AS, AS-PATH, and the sequence of relationship marks. Moreover, whether the Rule R1 is obeyed by all of ASs or not can be checked. To authenticate origin AS can defend against IP prefix hijacking; to authenticate AS-PATH can defend against AS-PATH tampering; to authenticate the sequence of relationship marks, and to check the Rule R1 can defend against the attack that is attracting more by announcing long paths.
The reason why IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH tampering can be prevented by authenticating origin AS and AS-PATH can be seen in S-BGP related documents, which is widely accepted [5] [6] . The main aim of presented method is to defend against attracting more by announcing long paths. Next, through the example attack shown as Fig. 1 , we illustrate the reason why our method can defend against attracting more by announcing long paths.
1) Defend Against Naive Strategy used by Malicious AS
Shown as Fig. 1(a) , when manipulator announces a three-hop available path, (m, a1, v, Prefix) to its provider "a2", the sequence of relationship marks drawn from SMG n by "a2" is <2, 1, 3>. According to the step 2 of Algorithm 2, this relationship sequence can not go through the check of relationship marks because neither "a1" nor "a2" is the customer of "m". This sequence violates the Rule 1.
If malicious AS "m" fabricates a false sequence of relationship marks, which does not violate the Rule R1, such as <2, 3, 3>, then step 2 of Algorithm 2 can be gone through. However, when "a2" executes the step 4 of Algorithm 2, the verification will fails because the true sequence of relationship signed by "a1" is <2, 1> rather than <2, 3>. The mailicious manipulator can not fabricate valid signature about <2, 3> because it has no private key corresponding to the public key pk 1 . The pk 1 is the public key of "a1", the corresponding private key of which is only owned by "a1".
Thus, by presented method, naive strategy used by malicious AS can be defended against.
2) Defend Against Clever Strategy used by Malicious AS Shown as Fig. 1(b) , when manipulator announces a four-hop available path, (m, a2, a3, v, Prefix) to its provider "a1", the sequence of relationship marks drawn from SMG n by "a1" is <2, 1, 1, 3>. According to the step 2 of Algorithm 2, this sequence can not go through the check of relationship marks because neither "a1" nor "a2" is the customer of "m". This sequence violates the Rule 1.
If malicious AS "m" fabricates a false sequence of relationship marks, which does not violate the Rule R1, such as <2, 3, 3, 3>, then step 2 of Algorithm 2 can be gone through. However, when "a1" executes the step 4 of Algorithm 2, the verification will fails because the true sequence of relationship signed by "a2" is <2, 1, 1> rather than <2, 3, 3>. The mailicious manipulator can not fabricate valid signature about <2, 3, 3> because it has no private key corresponding to the public key pk 2 . The pk 2 is the public key of "a2", the corresponding private key of which is only owned by "a2".
From above illustrations, we can see that by authenticating the sequence of relationship marks and checking the Rule R1, the presented method can defend against the attack that is attracting more by announcing long paths.
B. Propogation Delay
We use the SSFNet (Scalable Simulation Framework) simulation tool to compare the propogation delay of existing mechanisms and that of our mechanism. The simulation result is as Fig. 5 . 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Attracting more by announcing long paths, which is one of three surprising counterexamples of traffic attraction attacks, can not be defended against by almost all of existing secure routing protocol including S-BGP, BGPSEC, and soBGP. For preventing this attack, we present a method mainly by adding the sequence of relationship marks in update messages and verifying them. At the same time, the presented method combines the mechanisms of authenticating origin AS and AS-PATH, which have existed in S-BGP. The presented method can defend against the attack that is attracting more by announcing long paths, besides IP prefix hijacking and AS-PATH tampering. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work for defending against the attack that is attracting more by announcing long paths.
There are three surprising counterexamples, which are shown in document [16] and include the attack that is attracting more by announcing long paths. Future work will cover the extension of the presented method from defending against one of these three surprising counterexamples, to defending against all of them.
